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A FUTURE FORETOLD: NEO-ARISTOTELIAN PRAISE
OF POSTMODERN LEGAL THEORY'
Francis J. Mootz If
What does it mean to theorize? Is theory defined by its
practical effects, or by its refusal to become complicit in
everyday practices? Is the urge to theorize a product of
modernist ideology that leads us astray, or our openness to
enlightenment? These questions may have become more
pressing in the postmodern age, when strong conceptions of
theory have come under challenge, but these questions are
timeless. Therefore, it should not be surprising that
contemporary readings of Aristotle can provide a helpful guide
for uncovering the possibilities of postmodern legal theory. It is
natural to turn to Aristotle, who is well known for his analysis
of intellectual virtues, and particularly for his succinct
discussion in the Nicomachean Ethics' in which he draws
distinctions between epistin (scientific knowing) as exhibited
in theoria, technc (knowledge governing productive activity) as
exhibited in poiesis, and phronsis (moral-practical wisdom
about the right course of action in a situation) as exhibited in
praxis.2 From these divisions it would appear that Aristotle
© 2003 Francis J. Mootz III. All Rights Reserved.
Visiting Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe
School of Law, Fall 2002. Professor of Law, The Penn State University Dickinson
School of Law, fm3@psu.edu. A draft of this paper was presented at the Annual
Meeting of the Association for the Study of Law, Culture & the Humanities at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, March 8-9, 2002. I would like to thank Larry
Backer, Step Feldman, Gene Garver, Cathy Kemp, George Taylor and John Valauri for
their questions, comments and suggestions along the way. This paper was made
possible by a generous research stipend, for which I thank Penn State University and
Dean Peter Glenn.
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Christopher Rowe trans., 2002).
In the recent translation, these key distinctions are made in the following
way. "Systematic knowledge" (epistane concerns knowledge of things that cannot be
otherwise-that is to say, of necessary universals-and is capable of being
demonstrated by working from correct starting points. Id. at 179 (1139b). In contrast,
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sets theory, as the source of true and indubitable knowledge,
apart from both making and acting, even while admitting that
these latter activities are guided by knowledge in some form.3
"technical expertise" (techne and "wisdom" (phronfsis) both concern matters that can
be otherwise, in which there is an element of skill in creating a product or making a
correct decision about a course of action. But these intellectual virtues are also distinct
from each other:
Within the sphere of what can be otherwise, there are both things that belong
within the realm of production and things that belong within that of action;
but production is a different thing from action ... so that rational disposition
in the sphere of action will also be different from rational productive
disposition.
Id. at 179 (1140a). Aristotle also introduces "intellectual knowledge" (sophia) and
"intelligence" (nous) as intellectual virtues, but makes clear that intellectual knowledge
is just the result of the combination of intelligence and systematic knowledge. The
philosophical knowledge of sophia represents the highest attainment, in which the
person not only can determine what follows from the fixed starting points by means of
demonstration (epist&nel, but also has a true grasp of these starting points, which
Aristotle describes as systematic knowledge getting its "head ... in place." Id. at 181
(1141a).
Wisdom is different from systematic knowledge because it requires
deliberation rather than demonstration, and it is different from technical expertise
because it involves judgment following from lived experience rather than making.
An indication of this is that we also call those in a specific field wise if they
succeed in calculating well towards some specific worthy end on matters
where no exact technique applies .... Now nobody deliberates about things
that can not be otherwise, or about things that he has no possibility of doing.
So if in fact systematic knowledge involves demonstration, and there is no
possibility of demonstrating the sorts of things whose starting points can be
otherwise ... wisdom will not be systematic knowledge, and neither will it be
technical expertise: not systematic knowledge, because what is in the sphere
of action can be otherwise, and not technical expertise, because action and
production belong to different kinds.
Id. at 180 (1140a-1140b).
3 Aristotle is ambiguous about whether there is a hierarchy of knowledge,
and it is precisely this ambiguity that Heidegger, Gadamer and Dunne exploit in their
contemporary readings. At first glance, by characterizing the philosophical knowledge
of sophia as the marriage of intelligence and systematic knowledge, Aristotle would
appear to be privileging it as the highest form of knowing. Consider the following:
So intellectual accomplishment will be a combination of intelligence and
systematic knowledge-systematic knowledge, as it were with its head now in
place, of the highest objects. For it is a strange thing to think-if anyone does-
that political expertise, or wisdom, is what is to be taken most seriously;
unless, that is, man is the best thing there is in the universe.
Id. at 181 (1141a). But then, in the course of discussing wisdom (phronsis), Aristotle
appears to say the opposite:
And the person who is without qualification the good deliberator is the one
whose calculations make him good at hitting upon what is best for a human
being among practicable goods. Nor is wisdom only concerned with
universals: to be wise, one must also be familiar with the particular, since
wisdom has to do with action, and the sphere of action is constituted by
particulars. That is why sometimes people who lack universal knowledge are
more effective in action than others who have it-something that holds
especially of experienced people. Suppose someone knew that light meats are
easily digestible and so healthy, but not what sorts of meat are light: he won't
make anyone healthy, and the [experienced] person [lacking in systematic
[Vol. 68: 3
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This is precisely the paradox that we face in trying to
understand the role of theory in thinking about law. On one
hand, how can theoretical knowledge have any real-world effect
if it is sharply distinguished from making and acting; and,
perhaps more problematically, is practicing law more like
making a product or choosing the correct course of action? On
the other hand, how can theoretical knowledge be regarded as
genuine knowledge that rises above mere appearance if it
remains tied to making and acting?
In this Article, I argue that Aristotle can serve as an
important touchstone for rethinking the assumptions that lead
to the paradox of theory. I begin by describing this paradox in
greater detail, with reference to the challenges posed by
postmodern thinking. In the next Section, I briefly recount the
readings of Aristotle by contemporary philosophers Martin
Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Joseph Dunne, and
explore the different but related ways in which they tease out
ambiguities and subtleties in Aristotle's work. In the following
Section, I gather the insights from these contemporary
readings of Aristotle and propose a neo-Aristotelian account of
the relationship of theory and practice under postmodern
conditions. I then bring this description to bear in the setting of
legal theory by looking to postmodern psychotherapy as a
model of the relationship between theory and practice, a model
that can lead us to praise the role of theory even if we accept
the postmodern critique of traditional accounts of theory.
Postmodern psychotherapists exemplify a dynamic of theory
and practice that generates concrete suggestions for how
critical legal theorists can productively contribute to legal
studies. The practical demand for judgments, combined with
the normative injunction to do justice, makes law a particularly
knowledge] who knows that meat from birds is light and healthy will do so
more. But wisdom has to do with action; so we need to have both sorts of
excellence-no, we need wisdom more.
Id. at 182 (1141b) (emphasis and bracketed material added). This tension, of course, is
the continuing tension between theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge that is
the subject of this article.
A similar opposition is evidenced by Aristotle's distinction between
demonstration through dialectic and persuasion through rhetoric. Although Aristotle at
points appears to regard rhetoric as a kind of remedial mode of persuading simple
minds unable to appreciate a scientific demonstration, at other points he is much more
responsive to the sophistic insight that rhetorical deliberation is true reasoning. Along
the lines of analysis in this article, I discuss contemporary readings of Aristotle's
assessments of dialectic and rhetoric in Francis J. Mootz III, Rhetorical Knowledge in
Legal Practice and Theory, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 491, 519-25, 549 (1998) (assessing
Chaim Perelman's interpretation of the complexities of Aristotelian rhetoric).
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important venue for investigating the entwinement of theory
and practice. I conclude by suggesting that critical legal
scholarship by Bill Eskridge and Kathryn Abrams provide
examples of this dynamic of theory and practice.
I. THE PARADOX OF THEORY
In common understanding, academic life is synonymous
with theory. Academics theorize about people engaged in
practical affairs from a vantage point outside those practices.
During the past few decades, increasing numbers of American
law professors have embraced this model of academic life,
abandoning the professional model in which professors
synthesized legal developments into policy arguments for use
by the practicing bar in favor of the academic model of a
university professor engaged in interdisciplinary theoretical
inquiry.4 It would now appear to be beyond question that law
professors, like all true academics, theorize.
There are sharply conflicting views of what it means to
be a professor who theorizes. Outside the university, many
lampoon academic life as a retreat to an ivory tower. The pithy
phrase, "those who can't do, teach," captures this common
perception that academic theorizing masks an escape from
reality, most likely fueled by the professor's inadequacies in
practical matters. Under this view, law professors have
abandoned the real world of legal practice to promote theories
that are not subject to reality checks in courtrooms and
legislatures, but rather are tested only in the effete discourse of
legal theory. Judge Harry Edwards's protest that the legal
academy has abandoned the concerns of the bar and judiciary
crystallized the extent to which this is now the view of many
non-academic lawyers as well as the predominant view of the
general citizenry.5
4 Step Feldman charts this development and argues that law professors
should embrace their role as interdisciplinary scholars within the university. See
Stephen Feldman, Toy Story Too (or What Buzz Lightyear Can Teach Law Professors
About Their Future-and Their Past) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
5 See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). Edwards makes the point clearly
and succinctly:
The [law] schools should be training ethical practitioners and producing
scholarship that judges, legislators, and practitioners can use .... But many
law schools-especially the so-called "elite" ones-have abandoned their proper
place, by emphasizing abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship
and pedagogy. . . .As a consequence, it is my impression that judges,
[Vol. 68: 3
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Academics tend to respond to this skeptical view of
theorizing in two ways. Some theorists contend that the remove
from day-to-day practical life marks an ascent from the dark
cave of unreflective habit to the shining forth of knowledge. It
is not surprising that this view is attractive to academics, who
would like to think of themselves as overcoming the grubby
affairs of the practical world through the power of theory.
Another popular response to the skeptical view regards theory
as an instrumental means of motivating new and improved
practices. As scholars are quick to remind their critics, "there is
nothing as practical as a good theory."
Most contemporary legal theorists embody these
contradictory visions of theory in their work. Only the most
unreflective person could participate in the life of the academy
without a gnawing fear that academic life is a form of
intellectual self-pleasuring that shields the theorist from the
rigors of full-time legal practice. The criticism that theory is a
flight from reality is probably not far from the law professor's
mind, because-unlike philosophers, sociologists or political
theorists who trained only for academic life-a substantial
number of law professors practiced law, at least for a few years,
before joining the academy.6 Legal practice is not so easily
objectified as a target for theory when one's professional life
commenced by participating in the practice.
administrators, legislators, and practitioners have little use for much of the
scholarship that is now produced by members of the academy.
Id. at 35 (emphasis added). Judge Edwards also lambastes the practicing bar for
moving to the opposite extreme by emphasizing "pure commerce" over the professional
values of ethical practice. Id. at 34. He does not advocate a simple-minded rejection of
the significance of theory in law schools, however. Judge Edwards concludes that there
is a role for theory in a pluralistic academic setting that integrates theory, practice,
skills and ethical considerations. See Harry T. Edwards, A New Vision for the Legal
Profession, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 567, 572-73 (1997) (lauding NYU's adoption of such an
approach to legal education).
George Taylor reminded me that in a related-although different-vein,
Judge (formerly Professor) Richard Posner argues that weak and "spongy" moral
theory holds no relevance for legal practice, which is properly grounded only in "facts"
determined by the strong theoretical disciplines of the social sciences, and then are
accounted for in the pragmatic (which is to say, non-theoretical) activities of legal
reasoning. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL
THEORY (1999). I direct the reader to George Taylor's excellent critique of Posner's
attempt to demarcate the boundaries and roles of theory and practice, in Critical
Hermeneutics: The Intertwining of Explanation and Understanding as Exemplified in
Legal Analysis, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1101 (2000).
6 This may well be changing as increasing numbers of recently hired law
professors have no experience with legal practice other than a few high profile judicial
clerkships. An undercurrent of the criticism of this trend is the tendency it may have to
produce a heavily theoretical, overly intellectualized approach to law.
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Many legal theorists endorse both conceptions of theory
offered in rebuttal of the skeptical challenge. For example,
theorists within the law and economics movement descriptively
argue that legal discourse obscures the underlying reality that
law is a process of institutionalized wealth (or preference)
maximization, and they simultaneously make the normative
claim that certain legal doctrines interfere with this reality and
should therefore be abandoned. On the other side of the
political spectrum, feminist legal theorists undertake
theoretical projects to expose the gendered constitution of legal
practice, but also to suggest ways that law can overcome its
patriarchic roots. Despite their skeptical fears, then, legal
scholars often view legal theory as a means of getting at a
reality that is deeper than the self-understanding of legal
practice, and also as a means of reforming legal practice.
Postmodern thinking puts severe stress on the identity
of legal theorists because it appears to underwrite a
particularly corrosive version of the skeptical attitude while
also undermining the defensive responses. The philosophical
critique of grand narratives, coupled with the radically
pragmatic return to localized practices, has rendered theorizing
suspect. Postmodern critics argue that an embodied,
linguistically situated, social being cannot escape from the cave
of existence. Theory, like faith in God, appears to be a quaint
vestige of previous "bad faith" refusals to accept the finitude of
human existence. As a result of this critique, postmodern
discourse tends to regard theory as nothing more than a
provocative aesthetic, or it restricts theory to humble
assertions that it is competent only to describe the impotence of
theory. In short, postmodern critique reinforces the layman's
suspicions that academic theorists are irrelevant to the real
world of social practices.!
Stanley Fish pursues this line of thought with dogged
determination, asserting that theory-talk has consequences
only to the extent that it constitutes an accepted rhetorical
move within legal practice, despite the pretense that theory
governs practice from the outside.8 Fish concedes that theory-
For example, when postmodern thinkers defend leftist political
commitments, they often find it necessary to talk about leaving theory behind, or
moving beyond theory. See generally WHAT'S LEFT OF THEORY: NEW WORK ON THE
POLITICS OF LITERARY THEORY (Judith Butler et al. eds., 2000).
8 STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND
THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 316-467 (1989).
[Vol. 68: 3
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talk might be employed within legal practice if it meets the
rhetorical needs of that practice, but he insists that it is
fantasy to assume that any philosophical perspective could
justify, determine or change legal practice.9 For example, he
argues that Ronald Dworkin's jurisprudential critique of
competing conceptions of law, "however persuasive or
unpersuasive it might be," is beside the point since no
theoretical conception of legal practice provides a "program
according to which a judge might generate his practice."10 Fish
argues that Dworkin's theory of "law as integrity," if it is
anything, is "either the name of what we already do (without
any special prompting) or a rhetorical/political strategy by
means of which we give a certain necessary coloring to what
we've already done."" Theory, then, has consequences only to
the extent that it is a practice in its own right (the practice of
academic discourse), or to the extent that its theoretical devices
are already enmeshed in legal practice, but theory never
"stands in a relationship of precedence and mastery to other
practices."2
But the postmodern position is even more complex,
because postmodern anti-theorists tend to employ perplexing
jargon and wield sophisticated concepts in their work. Fish
adopts a deceptively simple and plain-spoken rhetorical ploy
(using baseball as a metaphor, for example"), but in many
instances postmodern critique exemplifies the kind of abstract
and impractical discourse that fuels disdain outside the
academy. Gianni Vattimo offers the only plausible answer to
the postmodern puzzle of whether one can challenge theory
without theorizing. Vattimo admits that his Nietzschean-
inspired philosophy of "weak thought" must be regarded as a
provisional interpretation that can claim no special epistemic
status deriving from theoretical insight. 4 Thus, genuine
9 See Stanley Fish, Play of Surfaces: Theory and the Law, in LEGAL
HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 297, 309 (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992).
10 FISH, supra note 8, at 357.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 337.
13 Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uies of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773
(1987).
14 See generally GIANNI VATTIMO, BEYOND INTERPRETATION: THE MEANING OF
HERMENEUTICS FOR PHILOSOPHY (David Webb trans., 1997). Vattimo summarizes:
That there are no facts, only interpretations, as Nietzsche teaches, is not in
its turn a certain and reassuring fact [that is theoretically grounded], but
.only" an interpretation. This renunciation of presence confers on post-
metaphysical philosophy, and above all on hermeneutics, an inevitably
2003]
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postmodern critique accepts its own "weak" status, which
means that it rejects strong conceptions of the power of theory,
but nevertheless continues the theoretical interrogation of
practices in some form. But what this means for legal theorists
remains, at best, opaque.
I address the postmodern puzzle regarding the nature of
theory and its relationship to practice by drawing from the
contemporary appropriations of Aristotle's practical philosophy
by Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Joseph
Dunne. My goal is to outline the role that critical legal
theorists can play in light of the neo-Aristotelian account of
theory that emerges from this discussion. Although this
account reinforces the postmodern critique by revealing that
the image of the sovereign theorist who stands as expert
commentator to the side of legal and social practices is an
ideological myth, this does not mean that theory is irrelevant.
Once theory is reconceived as a disposition within practice-as
an engagement in practice with a distinct comportment-its
unavoidable significance becomes clear.
II. RECUPERATING THE TENSIONS IN ARISTOTLE'S ACCOUNT
OF THEORY
A. Heidegger's Rediscovery of Theory in Aristotle
William McNeill recently connected Heidegger's early
lectures on Aristotle to themes that run throughout
Heidegger's work. 5  McNeill's comprehensive account of
Heidegger's critique and renewal of Aristotle's understanding
of theory provides the starting point for developing a
postmodern account of theory. Heidegger undermines the
modern prejudice that divorces theory and practice by
rediscovering an account of genuine human experience in
Aristotle's subtle phenomenology that maintains the lived
tension between practice and theory. Heidegger concludes that
"fallen" character. The overcoming of metaphysics, in other words, can only
take place as nihilism. The meaning of nihilism, however, if it is not in its
turn to take the form of a metaphysics of the nothing-as it would if one
imagined a process at the end of which Being is not and the nothing is-can
only think of itself as an indefinite process of reduction, diminution,
weakening.
Gianni Vattimo, The Trace of the Trace, in RELIGION 79, at 93 (Jacques Derrida &
Gianni Vattimo eds., David Webb trans., 1996).
15 WILLIAM MCNEILL, THE GLANCE OF THE EYE: HEIDEGGER, ARISTOTLE AND
THE ENDS OF THEORY (1999).
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the Western philosophical tradition ultimately reduced the
tensions in Aristotle's account to a reductionist conception of
technocratic reason, but he finds inspiration by returning to
Aristotle to rediscover an originary praxis in which thinking is
bound up with action.
The self-understanding of modern science reduces
techni to calculative and manipulative technology and limits
theoria to philosophical abstraction in the service of technology,
thereby separating both from praxis. Heidegger regards
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics as critically important because
it demonstrates that there is a "seeing" that is between
immediate sensory involvement and abstract philosophical
seeing: it is the Augenblick, or "glance of the eye," which
involves a momentary grasp of the presencing of an object. The
Augenblick is not theory, practice or making in our modern
usage of these terms. Rather, it is the phenomenological
ground for these experiences, which only later are
differentiated and opposed. Heidegger argues that the modern
separation of theory, practice and making conceals the
"originary rootedness of theoria, praxis, and poiesis in the
unitary and worldly being of Dasein. " "
The ancient word, theoria, had numerous meanings, but
Heidegger identifies a primary use as referring to an envoy
sent to participate in a ritual festival. 7 In this usage, theoria
was a celebratory immersion in the divine and a break from
mundane routines, but this immersion involved an intense
involvement in the world rather than an escape from worldly
affairs. Heidegger emphasizes that our originary experience of
the world is a form of praxis. It is a tarrying with "what is
becoming" that is different from unthinking habit and mere
curiosity. He argues that the experience of great art recalls this
originary experience of tarrying, in which theory, practice and
action are bound up in a response to the other.
The great work of art thus acts as the shock and thrust, the stimulus
of a steadfast reminder or recollection of the play of being and
nonbeing, prompting our wonder and astonishment.I
The call that issues from the work itself to tarry in its presence, in
the face of the extraordinary, of the divinity of the Earth, i.e.[,] of
what we might call the Earthworld, thus invites a response akin to
16 Id. at 281.
Id. at 263-66.
18 Id. at 291.
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that of ancient theoria. The call to let the work be a work by tarrying
in its presence, granting it time by responding to the possibility of its
time, entering our own time as that of the work, as the presencing of
an extraordinary being-this call, as a call to preservation, is the call
to essential knowing, to Wissen.'s
Heidegger concludes that the manipulative seeing of
modern technological consciousness, with its attendant
divisions between theoretical seeing and productivity, is
parasitical on the originary comportment of caring that is most
dramatically revealed in our response to the work of art.
McNeill emphasizes that Heidegger does not simply
reverse the priority by subsuming theory under unreflective
practice, 20 nor does he erase the distinction between the two
comportments. 1 Theory, practice and making are all caring
dispositions in the world, and they mutually reinforce each
other as dispersions of an originary Augenblick. Consequently,
although Heidegger cites Aristotle's analysis of phronisis as an
important concession that points toward the originary praxis
19 Id. at 295.
20 McNeill insists that Heidegger does not seek a reversal in priority:
What seems clear from these considerations is that Heidegger, while
emphasizing the way in which theoretical contemplation emerges within the
context of a worldly involvement with things, and specifically with producing
or making, is not indicating any ontological order of founding with respect to
these two modes. The initial goal is to make both forms of comportment
visible as modes of worldly concern.
MCNEILL, supra note 15, at 61.
21 Heidegger acknowledges the differences between theory, practice and
making by regarding them as dispersions that conceal the unitary ground from which
they emanate. In short, he acknowledges that the differences are derivative, but not
illusory. McNeill explains:
Contemplation, as noncircumspective, remains a kind of concern. Heidegger
therefore seeks to emphasize that one should not view "theoretical" and
"practical" comportment as mutually exclusive ways of being that reciprocally
supplement one another. Theoretical comportment is itself a form of acting, of
comportment, just as practical comportment (or "action" in a broad sense) is
also a seeing, indeed one that does not first need "theory" to inform it....
Heidegger's point, then, is not that there is no difference between
theoretical and circumspective comportment, between "theory" and "practice."
Quite to the contrary. His point is simply that this difference must be
understood in terms of its unitary ground, as a distinction between different
modes of (concernful) being-in-the-world, different ways of uncovering beings
within the world....
Circumspection and theoretical contemplation are dispersed, already
differentiated ways of concern. This dispersion is not only factical, but also
historical, that is, it occurs as the concrete enactment of certain
interpretations of the being of beings. From the point of view of the analytic,
however, the difficulty remains of how to access Dasein's being prior to such
dispersion. In terms of what can we recognize such dispersion as dispersion?
Id. at 67-68.
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before its occlusions in modernity,22 he argues that regarding
phronsis as the originary ground would represent an
inauthentic collapse into one of the dispersions of originary
being.23 Heidegger's point is not just that the subtleties of
phronisis resist the simplification of Aristotle's work by later
philosophers, but that Aristotle's conceptions of techni and
theoria are equally ambivalent and conflicted.
B. Gadamer's Praise of Theory
It might be surprising that Hans-Georg Gadamer-
Heidegger's student and a leading proponent of post-
Enlightenment hermeneutical philosophy-recently published
a collection of essays entitled Praise of Theory.24 It is easy to
misconstrue Gadamer's careful rehabilitation of Aristotelian
practical philosophy in response to modern scientific ideology
as an abandonment of theory and a return to practice as the
source of human understanding. But in a speech delivered
when he was eighty years old, Gadamer acknowledges the
importance of theory not only to his life's work, but to social life
generally.25 Gadamer revives Aristotle's practical philosophy
not to supplant theory, but rather to restore the essential
equilibrium of theory and practice that has been disturbed in
modernity. Gadamer's sustained attention to these themes
during his long career provides important elaborations and
extensions of Heidegger's earlier work.
Modern technological consciousness warps social life
because it reduces theory to nothing more than applied
research and it reduces practice to nothing more than the
implementation of efficient technologies. This leads Gadamer,
following Heidegger, to ask: "Is there perhaps more to theory
than what the modern institution of science represents to us?
And, is practice, too, perhaps more than the mere application of
22 Heidegger argues that Aristotle's concession that theoria is a form of
praxis, and therefore that it cannot be sharply distinguished from phronisis or techni
provides an opening for a destruktion of the metaphysical tradition and its later
emphasis on the separation of theory and practice. Id. at 17-54 (Chapter 2: "Vision in
Theory and Praxis: Heidegger's Reading of Aristotle (1924)").
23 Id. at 100-07.
HANS-GEORG GADAMER, PRAISE OF THEORY: SPEECHES AND ESSAYS (Chris
Dawson trans., 1998). All of the speeches and essays came after the original
publication of Warheit und Methode in 1960, and most of them are from the late 1970s
and early 1980s, reflecting Gadamer's mature thinking.
25 See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, Praise of Theory, in PRAISE OF THEORY, supra
note 24, at 16-36 (reprinting a speech originally given in Bonn on June 3, 1980).
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science? Are theory and practice correctly distinguished at all
when they are seen only in opposition to each other?"26 He
concludes that the opposition of practice and theory is
mistaken, and that "theory is just as primordial an
anthropological datum as is practical and political power. So
everything depends on constantly renewing the balance
between these two human forces. And I am convinced that
human society exists only because and as long as there is a
balance of this kind."
27
Gadamer credits Aristotle for recognizing that theory is
a relinquishment of immediate and pressing questions within a
practice. Theory can never be completely segregated from
practical engagement with others because it is a comportment
within practice. Nevertheless, theory is an openness to
different understandings that can reveal the unproductive
nature of one's prevailing prejudices precisely because it is
intersubjective. Gadamer draws this lesson by closely reading
Book Six of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, in which Aristotle
moves beyond the opposition of epistrnj and techni by
introducing phronLsis as moral-practical knowledge that is
more in the nature of a cultivated disposition to apply general
considerations non-deductively to the practical demands for
ethical action in a given context.28 In contrast to Heidegger's
attention to the originary ground of experience that subtends
Aristotle's taxonomy, Gadamer emphasizes the special role
that phron sis plays in Aristotle's analysis.29
Although a techni can be learned and forgotten,
phronsis cannot be learned in advance and then later applied;
instead, moral knowledge is revealed only in the thoughtful
actions of a moral individual. ° Gadamer explains this point by
26 Id. at 24.
27 See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, Science and the Public Sphere, in PRAISE OF
THEORY, supra note 24, at 62-70, 68 (reprinting a lecture originally given in Marburg
in 1977).
2 See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 312-24 (Joel
Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall, rev. trans., 2d rev. ed. 1992) (1960; 5th German
ed. 1986).
29 Gadamer's relationship with Heidegger's thought exemplifies his
hermeneutical philosophy: he is a careful and charitable reader who challenges himself
to learn from Heidegger while at the same time he moves in new directions on
important issues. See Robert J. Dostal, Gadamer's Relation to Heidegger and
Phenomenology, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO GADAMER 247, 247 (Robert J.
Dostal ed., 2002) (describing Gadamer's characterization of the "complex relationship"
as "one of constant challenge and provocation"); ROD COLTMAN, THE LANGUAGE OF
HERMENEUTICS: GADAMER AND HEIDEGGER IN DIALOGUE (1998).
'0 GADAMER, supra note 28, at 317-20.
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distinguishing judicial decisionmaking-which requires a just
weighing of both equities and rule of law values in the context
of a particular case-from the activity of a craftsman-which
involves the skillful achievement of a design that is known in
advance.3 "That is why," Gadamer explains, "it is pointless to
distinguish... between knowledge and experience [in the case
of moral judgment], as can be done in the case of a techn. For
moral knowledge contains a kind of experience in itself .. 32
In other words, because phronsis simultaneously is
knowledge, experience and action, it can be distinguished from
the "ends-means" calculus of techn according to which the
craftsman first learns the eidos of a table, then gains
experience in making tables, and finally produces a table.
In one respect, Gadamer's distinction between these
dispositions is just a nuanced development of Heidegger's
pathbreaking distinction between deliberative activities
(phronisis and technel and scientific knowing (epistctnJ and
sophia) in building his fundamental ontology.33 But Gadamer
also believes that this distinction is a defining feature of his
philosophical hermeneutics. Gadamer regards phronisis as a
fundamental form of experience because it is uniquely
experiential, in which the ends and means are simultaneously
determined within practical situations.
That is, phronsis becomes what he calls "genuine" or "real"
experience, insofar as its application both participates in and reflects
upon the immediate human situation. By "real experience" Gadamer
means "that in which humanity becomes conscious of its finitude. In
it the ability to make (das Machenk6nnen) and the self-consciousness
of its planning reason find their limits." Phronsis, in other words,
not only distinguishes itself from techne but also acts as a critique of
31 Id. at 318.
32 Id. at 322. Gadamer draws from one of Aristotle's most important
distinctions between techn and phron sis: while there is such a thing as excellence in
technJ (i.e., the carpenter can do an excellent job in crafting a piece of furniture), there
can be no excellence in phron sis (i.e., one cannot be an excellent good person who acts
appropriately). In other words, it might be the case that a carpenter would choose to do
a poor job in a particular instance, as when she is helping her daughter to construct a
science fair exhibit, but still have technical expertise in the form of knowledge. It
makes no sense to say, however, that the wise person could choose to act poorly but
still have wisdom and ethical knowledge. Phronesis is a product of cumulative
experience that literally becomes part of the person, and is not knowledge that the
person may put aside or forget in a given instance. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at 180
(1140b).
See COLTMAN, supra note 29, at 17-24.
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all purely cognitive reasoning by partaking in what Gadamer refers
to as "the experience of human finitude."3 4
By recuperating the distinctive features of Aristotle's
phronsis, Gadamer argues, it is possible to recover the
hermeneutic dimension of life in a manner that reorients our
thinking about theory and practice.
Gadamer reaffirms the value of science and scientific
theory, despite his challenge to the methodological self-
understanding of science. He explains that theory is "not so
much the individual momentary act as a way of comporting
oneself, a position and condition"35 of openness. Underneath the
facade of disinterested method, Gadamer believes that the real
activity of the natural sciences exemplifies a spirit of
attentiveness that seeks to press beyond current prejudices by
means of reconstituting the hermeneutic relationship between
theory and fact.86 Consequently, although he argues that "the
only productive or appropriate way for the human sciences to
think of themselves is on the model of Aristotle's practical
philosophy rather than the modern concept of scientific
method,"37 he certainly does not reject science or scientific
theory. By acknowledging that theory is inseparable from
practice he rejects claims on behalf of a special form of
scientific theory in favor of identifying the theoretical
disposition that subtends all forms of inquiry and is woven into
the very fabric of social life.
It would not be hard to show that modern science always
presupposed this concept of theory as a condition of its own
existence. But where does that get us? In returning to the basic
constitution of mankind, are we actually still dealing with theory, or
with practice and interactions between people and things that we
34 Id. at 22 (quoting GADAMER, supra note 28, at 357).
35 GADAMER, Praise of Theory, supra note 25, at 31.
36 See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, The Ideal of Practical Philosophy, in PRAISE
OF THEORY, supra note 24, at 50-61, 53 (reprinting lecture originally given in Marburg
in 1977) (arguing that the pretense of a distinctive epistemology in the natural sciences
is precluded because the 'mere accumulation of facts constitutes no experience at all,
let alone the foundation of empirical science. It is the 'hermeneutic' relationship
between fact and theory that is decisive in this field too."); GADAMER, Science and the
Public Sphere, supra note 27, at 68 ("Whoever is able to achieve distance from himself,
who gains insight into the limitedness of his sphere of life, and so openness to others,
experiences constant correction by reality. Science has made this its most noble duty.
Its freedom from ends serves to liberate us from those overly narrow ends that our
wishes and illusions constantly create in us. This is the famous education to objectivity
that makes a researcher.").
37 GADAMER, The Ideal of Practical Philosophy, supra note 36, at 50.
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certainly could not call theoretical? Can this be right? Is theory
ultimately a practice, as Aristotle already stressed, or is practice, if
it is truly human practice, always at the same time theory? Is it not,
if it is human, a looking away from oneself and looking out toward
the other, disregarding oneself and listening for the other? Life,
then, is a unity of theory and practice that is the possibility and the
duty of everyone. Disregarding oneself, regarding what is: that is the
behavior of a cultivated, I might almost say a divine, consciousness.
It does not need to be a consciousness cultivated by and for science;
it only needs to be a humanly cultivated consciousness that has
learned to think along with the viewpoint of the other and try to
come to an understanding about what is meant and what is held in
38
common.
Reconceived in light of Aristotle's distinctive accounting of
phronisis, theory is not the dominion only of scientists or
academic specialists; it is intimately connected with social
practices.
Gadamer elaborates Heidegger's etymology of theoria as
participating in a festival. McNeill notes that Gadamer's
contribution is to insist that the "being-there" of the festival "is
not to be understood as a comportment of subjectivity.
Participation here has the sense of being delivered over to
whatever is unfolding, to events in their disclosure, of an
attentiveness that is held by beings themselves as they appear
and conceal themselves."39 This underscores why Gadamer
chooses to place primary significance on phronesis: it is social
reason that is rooted in dialogic traditions, rather than
cognitive mastery of data or technical mastery of materials.
Phron~sis is exemplary, for Gadamer, because it exhibits the
sociality of reason and the practical dimensions of theory in
ways that too often are obscured.
Gadamer investigates phronesis not only to continue
Heidegger's attack on the technical conception of theory and
knowledge, but also to highlight how his path of thinking
diverges from Heidegger's. Although Heidegger's early lectures
introduced the notion of theory as a "tarrying," his later work
too often represented the Augenblick as an instantaneous flash
of insight, a lightning bolt direct from the gods as it were. ' °
38 GADAMER, Praise of Theory, supra note 25, at 35.
39 MCNEILL, supra note 15, at 272 (discussing GADAMER, Praise of Theory,
supra note 25).
40 Dostal, supra note 29, at 255. Dostal notes that Heidegger's early
conception of the event of truth as tarrying in response to a disclosure becomes a
sudden and abrupt Augenblick in Being and Time, and then in later writings is
represented by the metaphor of "lightning." Conversation plays an important role in
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Gadamer carries forward Heidegger's original impulse by
emphasizing the sociality and historical character of phron isis
as experiences that cumulate in the disposition of practical-
moral wisdom within a given setting.4' Gadamer pursues the
notion of truth as a "tarrying." Truth is revealed in an
Augenblick in the sense that truth comes to being only in the
moment, and not as the product of a methodological application
of pre-existing principles, or in the sense of being a flash of
insight delivered from above. Robert Dostal explains
Gadamer's development of Heidegger's concept:
Tarrying, as the way of attending to art or to the world, is to be
understood as a mode of comportment (to speak anglicized
Heideggerian) or as a habit (to speak anglicized Aristotelian).
"Tarrying" takes time, and in tarrying we lose ourselves in the thing
and, thereby, lose track of time. Where Heidegger would have us
await the sudden flash of insight, Gadamer would have us develop
the habit of tarrying with things.
This tarrying is also a conversation-a conversation with one-
self, with the thing at hand, and with others about whatever is at
stake. . . . Although Heidegger, both in Being in Time with its
concept of Being-with (Mitsein) and in his later work, provides a
framework for the social and the dialogical, he never makes good on
this aspect of the conversation that he says we are. The later
Heidegger is not so much conversing as he is waiting and listening
for the voice of the gods .... the truth-event for Heidegger is best
characterized as the voice of the gods, [it] comes like lightning-
unmediated and "without a bridge." Gadamer, however, explicitly
Heidegger's conception of truth, Dostal continues, but it is a conversation between us
and the gods that is not captured in ordinary language.
4' GADAMER, supra note 28, at 346-62. In this section of his book, Gadamer
characterizes historically-effected consciousness as the product of experience, but he
argues for a normative understanding of experience. Experience is not just a string of
events, but rather implies a continuing openness to the revision of unproductive
prejudices in a manner that settles into dispositions. The cultivated and experienced
person embraces this historical and social process of coming to understanding, which
seemingly occurs without effort within the moment. Recalling Aristotle's image of the
fleeing army that "suddenly" stands fast and responds to orders, Gadamer writes that
this "image captures the curious openness in which experience is acquired, suddenly,
through this or that feature, unpredictably, and yet not without preparation, and it is
valid from then on until there is a new experience-i.e., it holds not only for this or that
instance but everything of the kind." Id. at 352. Gadamer concludes this discussion by
distinguishing the monological inquiry of science from the dialogic inquiry that marks
hermeneutical understanding, recalling his distinction between epistcnj and
phronesis: "The hermeneutical consciousness culminates not in the methodological
sureness of itself, but in the same readiness for experience that distinguishes the
experienced man from the man captivated by dogma." Id. at 362.
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characterizes the conversation with the other as providing a
"bridge."
42
Gadamer's emphasis on dialogue as the cornerstone of his
philosophy emerges from this complex conception of theory,
practice, understanding and truth that is drawn from
Aristotle's discussion ofphronisis.
Gadamer draws more from Aristotle than his
differentiation of phronLsis from epistmtn and techn, insisting
that Aristotle provides substantial guidance on the interactions
of practice and theory by his very activity of writing the
Nicomachean Ethics. In this work, Aristotle quite obviously is
not engaged in making ethical decisions; he is theorizing about
ethical decisionmaking. Gadamer's praise of theory should
come as no surprise, because his philosophical hermeneutics is
a theoretical treatment of the practical activity of
interpretation in much the same fashion as Aristotle's practical
philosophy is a theoretical treatment of ethical decisionmaking.
Gadamer justifies his theoretical bent by insisting that his
philosophical hermeneutics "must arise from practice itself
and, with all the typical generalizations that it brings to
explicit consciousness, be related back to practice."43 In this
respect, the theoretical activity of philosophical hermeneutics
represents a genuine theoretic comportment in the manner
modeled by Aristotle's practical philosophy."
Theory is a distinctive part of dealing with the
paradoxical social demands for action that are placed on
individuals, but it remains intimately related to practice and
cannot be separated entirely. As Gadamer insists, the "myth of
the ivory tower where theoretical people live is an unreal
fantasy. We all stand in the middle of the social system."45
42 Dostal, supra note 29, at 257.
43 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy, in REASON
IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE at 88, 92 (Frederick G. Lawrence trans., 1981). See also HANS-
GEORG GADAMER, Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task, in REASON IN THE
AGE OF SCIENCE, supra, at 113.
44 Gadamer summarizes his discussion of Aristotle:
[Ihf we relate Aristotle's description of the ethical phenomenon, and especially
the virtue of moral knowledge to our own investigation, we find that his
analysis in fact offers a kind of model of the problems of hermeneutics. We too
determined that application is neither a subsequent nor merely an occasional
part of the phenomenon of understanding, but codetermines it as a whole
from the beginning.
GADAMER, supra note 28, at 324.
45 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, The Diversity of Europe: Inheritance and Future,
in HANS-GEORG GADAMER ON EDUCATION, POETRY, AND HISTORY: APPLIED
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Gadamer has been duly credited for advancing Heidegger's
analysis by more carefully distinguishing phronisis from
techni and for emphasizing the especial significance of
phronisis for the project of philosophical hermeneutics,46 which
signals Gadamer's focus on the social dimensions of reason. But
Heidegger's reading of the complexities of Aristotle's use of
techni is important to the task of uncovering the relationship
between theory and practice in law.
To complete my recovery of an Aristotelian account of
postmodern theory, I turn to Joseph Dunne's reading of
Aristotle's techn. Dunne works from a Gadamerian
perspective that is committed to the social reason most clearly
demonstrated in phronisis, but he is attentive to the broader
themes advanced by Heidegger in that he does not simply
elevate the model of phronisis as the only genuine
comportment.
C. Dunne's Refinement of Aristotle's Treatment of Techn5
In Back to the Rough Ground, Joseph Dunne reviews
efforts by several contemporary philosophers to rework
Aristotle's assessment of the connections between theory and
practice, placing special emphasis on Gadamer's
investigations.47 Dunne credits Gadamer with demonstrating
that Aristotle's phronisis overcomes a narrow conception of
rationality by linking reasoning and the ethical being of the
person," and with revealing how Aristotle's ethics provide a
model of how one can theoretically interrogate a practice after
the demise of metaphysical theory.49 But Dunne criticizes
HERMENEUTICS 221 (Dieter Misgeld & Graeme Nicholson eds., Lawrence Schmidt &
Monica Reuss trans., 1992).
46 See COLTMAN, supra note 29, at 19-23.
41 See JOSEPH DUNNE, BACK TO THE ROUGH GROUND: PRACTICAL JUDGMENT
AND THE LURE OF TECHNIQUE (1997) (discussing the retrieval of phronsis and techni
by John Henry Newman, R.G. Collingwood, Hannah Arendt, Hans-Georg Gadamer and
Jirgen Habermas).
4 Id. at 125-27.
41 Id. at 160. Dunne summarizes this important dimension of Gadamer's
recovery of Aristotle:
[I]f the claims of all self-inflated sciences and philosophies are to be rejected,
hermeneutics, as the philosophy which both does this rejecting and at the
same time brings our finitude into the clearest relief, itself comes to embody
the highest aspirations of reason-a reason which now recognizes itself as
irredeemably practical. . . . Indeed, in Gadamer's deconstruction,
hermeneutics must carry an even greater weight than Aristotle's practical
philosophy did. For the latter was always to some degree overshadowed by
the transcendent status of theoria or sophia .... For us now, on the other
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Gadamer's sharp opposition between phronisis and techni in
advancing these claims, arguing that Aristotle's techni is a
fluid concept that exhibits the tension between theory and
practice within itself.5 ° The effect of Dunne's study is to expand
Gadamer's inquiry along the lines of Heidegger's original
thinking, but without lapsing into Heidegger's later
mysticism.51
Dunne argues that there are affinities between certain
technai and phron:sis, especially in the case of medicine. 2 A
physician does not act solely by learning universal theoretical
truths, and then applying them with skill to particular cases."
The ends-means calculus traditionally associated with
techni misses the deliberative character of the physician-
patient relationship.54 In a recently published collection of
essays,55  Gadamer makes this same point about the
hermeneutical dimension of practicing medicine, although he
does not take this opportunity to recast his narrow reading of
Aristotle's use of techni 55 Gadamer's theme is that modern
hand, with "the getting over of metaphysics," no such theoria is any longer
possible. And so hermeneutics must assume the role not only of practical
philosophy but of a practical philosophy which itself has to "take the place of
a theoria whose ontological legitimation may be found only in an intellectus
infinitus that is unknown to an existential experience unsupported by
revelation."
Id. at 164 (quoting the later Heidegger without specific attribution, and then quoting
HANS-GEORG GADAMER, On the Origins of Philosophical Hermeneutics, in
PHILOSOPHICAL APPRENTICESHIPS 183 (R.R. Sullivan trans., 1985) (1977)).
DUNNE, supra note 47, at 229.
5' See, e.g., P. CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE HERMENEUTICS OF ORIGINAL
ARGUMENT: DEMONSTRATION, DIALECTIC, RHETORIC (1998). Smith argues that
Heidegger failed to fulfill the project of developing a "hermeneutics of facticity." Smith
repeatedly invokes Gadamer's focus on the social realm of everyday speech as an
antidote to Heidegger's elitist, monological quest to experience truth through poetry.
See, e.g., id. at 312 n.5.
52 DUNNE, supra note 47, at 253-61.
Dunne emphasizes Aristotle's ambivalence. On the one hand, in the
Metaphysics Aristotle appears to assume that medicine is a "making" that can proceed
analytically from a noesis, but later Aristotle appears to recognize that a physician
must deliberate with his patient about the ends of treatment. Id. at 350.
' Id. at 350-53.
55 See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, THE ENIGMA OF HEALTH: THE ART OF HEALING
IN A SCIENTIFIC AGE (Jason Gaiger & Nicholas Walker trans., 1996) (1993).
In his essay, Apologia for the Art of Healing, Gadamer suggests that it is
the imposition of the concept of techni on medicine that has led to the scientistic
approach to healing. He draws a sharp contrast between the Greek concept of
techni as the skillful production of something that imitates a model (usually found in
nature) and the practice of medicine as a restoration of equilibrium rather than a
productive art. "The necessary integration of a differentiated body of knowledge and
skills into the practical unity of treatment and healing cannot emerge from that
powerful force of knowing and acting that modern science cultivates in a
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scientific consciousness has reduced the self-understanding of
medicine to mere techni, although it has not eliminated
altogether the dialogic character of the healing arts.57 Dunne's
study shows that Aristotle's treatment of techni already
imports within it the subtleties that Gadamer attempts to re-
introduce. He argues that the assumed polarity between a
theoretical-universal approach operative in techni and an
experiential-practical approach operative in phronsis can also
be viewed as a polarity "implicit in Aristotle's treatment of
techne itself.""
The rise of modern technocratic consciousness was
fueled, Dunne believes, by Aristotle's failure to recognize
explicitly that technJ has an experiential base no less than
phron~sis.9 Aristotle generally speaks of techni as bringing to
bear self-sufficient theoretical knowledge in a productive
manner, but intermittently he suggests that technJ is gained
through experience.0 There are several prominent and
revealing examples of Aristotle's more expansive (that is, less
theoretical) understanding of techni Perhaps the most
important instance occurs in the context of Aristotle's famous
claim that equity is a necessary counterbalance to the
universality of law in achieving excellence in the virtue of
methodologically precise manner." Id. at 35. He concludes that the attempt to regard
medicine as a techni has not been entirely successful.
Among all the sciences concerned with nature the science of medicine is the
one which can never be understood entirely as a technology, precisely because
it invariably experiences its own abilities and skills simply as a restoration of
what belongs to nature. And that is why medicine represents a peculiar unity
of theoretical knowledge and practical know-how within the domain of the
modem sciences, a unity moreover which as such cannot be understood as the
application of science to the field of praxis. Medicine itself represents a
peculiar kind of practical science for which modern thought no longer
possesses an adequate concept.
Id. at 39. As explained below, Dunne's point is that medicine was regarded as a
techni by Aristotle, notwithstanding the connections between theoretical knowing and
practical activity that Gadamer identifies. In other words, the very concept of techni is
more complex than the traditional readings of Aristotle recognize.
67 Gadamer claims that medicine exemplifies the tensions between practice
and theory in the modern world. "The example of the doctor thus shows with special
clarity how the relationship between theory and practice comes to a critical point under
the conditions of modern science." Id. at 20. He explains that the "enigma of health is
just one small example from the range of problems which confront us. Everywhere it is
a question of finding the right balance between our technical capacities and the need
for responsible actions and choices." Id. at viii-ix.
DUNNE, supra note 47, at 314.
'9 See generally id. at 315-56 (Chapter 10: "Beyond the 'Official' Notion of
Techne: Recovering the Experiential Background").
6o Id. at 319-20.
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justice. This leads Aristotle to contend that moral action is
premised on a steady disposition built on life experience rather
than being a simple matter of applying universal moral norms
to a situation.
And to show this Aristotle reaches quite unproblematically for a
medical, i.e., technical, analogy: one might as well say that "to know
[eidenai] what honey, wine and hellebore, cautery and surgery are"
is easy. Indeed, such knowing is easy, but for the "task of being a
doctor (ergon ... iatron einai) it is not sufficient; one is not a doctor
unless one knows "how, to whom, and when to administer [these
things-honey, etc.] with a view to producing health." ... What is
involved here, quite clearly, is a kind of discriminating
resourcefulness that will be available only to one who has been
informed by a wealth of experience, and the point I am making is
that Aristotle in this passage attributes this both to the virtuous
person and to the technitds.5'
The techni of the physician is no less a matter of experience
than the phronsis of the politician, and they both represent a
spiraling synergy of theory and practice in experience.
Dunne agrees that the techni of medicine cannot be
captured by a purely technical account because physicians
work with other humans rather than on inert materials;
consequently, physicians, rhetoricians, artists and other
technit&s who exhibit excellence in their interactions with
others are particularly likely to exhibit knowledge similar to
the phronsis of the statesman.62 But even the work of a master
carpenter who confronts new and unexpected challenges
deviates from the simplistic model of mechanically reproducing
61 Id. at 334 (quoting Nicomachean Ethics, Book V, 1137a). In concluding his
discussion of the internal morality of law, Lon Fuller cites to Aristotle's analogy to
medicine as capturing the experiential basis of excellence in law and as a rejection of
the idea that simple, universal rules can be applied to particular circumstances
without difficulty. In other words, Fuller's desiderata of the morality of law are not
offered as determinate guides for decision so much as points of reference for judicious
weighing, just as medical learning informs the physician's task of healing.
The application of a simple rule [or morality] ought itself to be simple. But
this is not so, Aristotle says, invoking at this point a favorite analogy, that of
medicine. "It is an easy matter to know the effects of honey, wine, hellebore,
cautery and cutting. But to know how, for whom, and when we should apply
these as remedies is no less an undertaking than being a physician."
So we may in turn say: It is easy to see that laws should be clearly
expressed in general rules that are prospective in effect and made known to
the citizen. But to know how, under what circumstances, and in what balance
these things should be achieved is no less an undertaking than being a
lawgiver.
LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 94 (rev. ed. 1969) (1964) (quoting Nicomachean
Ethics, Book V, 1137a).
62 DUNNE, supra note 47, at 359.
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an eidos that one grasps theoretically." Dunne suggests that
this feature of technical excellence proves that Aristotle's
distinction between techn5 and phronsis discounts too heavily
the creativity borne of experience and experimentation.
Finally, Dunne emphasizes that Aristotle does not
discriminate carefully between technj as an excellence of
knowledge that has an explanatory power and technj as an
excellence of knowledge in bringing about an effect. In this
respect, The Rhetoric is the corollary to the Nicomachean
Ethics, in that by writing the text, Aristotle reveals his
understanding of the theoretical dimensions of rhetorical
practice without necessarily demonstrating his oratorical
skills.64 Dunne concludes that techni, no less than phronisis,
involves a theoretical "seeing" that is bound up with a practical
engagement, and that in neither case can the theoretical
"seeing" methodologically direct the practical engagement.65
In the end, then, Dunne arrives at the same point as
Gadamer, but he does so by working within the concept of
techn. Dunne's inquiries are motivated by his concerns about
the increasingly technical approach to teaching, under which
teaching is viewed as the production of knowledge in the minds
of pupils. His theoretical inquiries yield the paradoxical lesson
that his own theoretical conclusions cannot purport to direct
the practice of teaching from "outside" this primary practical
engagement. Nevertheless, a chastened theoretical disposition
remains important because it prevents practical engagements
from being warped by a technicist self-understanding.
Although the reflection we pursued here is, of course, theoretical, it
is nonetheless paradoxical in its effect. For it is a form of theory
whose whole import is to vindicate practical knowledge-and
thereby to severely curtail the claims of theoretical knowledge on
practice. It not only exposes the limitations of the kind of theory that
informs the technical approach but it also recognizes the modesty of
its own contribution to practice. Its role is not to instruct or dictate
to practitioners. It does not offer any countermodel to the technical
model. Nor is its argument merely moralistic-preaching how things
ought to be to a world that is no better disposed to philosophical than
it is to religious homiletics. It draws attention not to what ought to
Id. at 283-84.
' Id. at 315-19.
65 Eugene Garver's treatment of Aristotle's account of rhetoric fits well here:
Aristotle regarded rhetoric as an art of character, and did not regard rhetoric as the
mechanical assembly of arguments that have only logical force. See EUGENE GARVER,
ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC: AN ART OF CHARACTER (1994).
[Vol. 68: 3
A FUTURE FORETOLD
be, so much as to what is the case anyhow-even though the
technicist project does not recognize it and even tries to suppress it."
Dunne's Gadamerian understanding of the power of his
theoretical inquiries is important, however, because it broadens
Gadamer's conclusions from the scope of phronsis to the scope
of technc as well.
What, then, are Dunne's conclusions about the role of
theory, both in the techni of teaching and in techni and
phronisis generally? First, his account provides an example of
a theoretical tarrying with the practical activity of teaching in
order to make sense of its current technicist self-
understanding. Thus, theory is a comportment within and
toward a practice that overcomes the natural tendency to
forego reflection and to objectify the dynamics of the practice,
as might happen when a teacher becomes so wrapped up in
day-to-day tasks that she begins to embody the prevailing
technicist conception of teaching.67 Second, he emphasizes the
degree to which theory and practice are intertwined features of
practices such as teaching, even if it is helpful and important to
distinguish them from each other. A good teacher reflects on
her practices, and can learn through guided reflection by those
who already are skilled in the practice." Theory is an
66 DUNNE, supra note 47, at 365.
61 Dunne summarizes the role of his theory of teaching-and also Gadamer's
theory of interpretation and Aristotle's theories of rhetoric and ethics-as a drawing
back from the natural urge to lose oneself in one's own projections.
The task of philosophy-or, at any rate, of the type of philosophy explored
here-has been to avoid being absorbed into this [objectified] frame [of
mastering one's environment] that we impose and, by maintaining a space for
reflection outside it, to articulate its limits and to draw attention to aspects
and dimensions of existence which do not appear within the frame but which,
nonetheless, continue to give human life its density and even make the frame
itself possible .... They are the "necessary conditions" of human experience,
which all our projects at mastery actually build on but which, despite our
ambitions, we cannot supplant or co-opt: there will be no project to make
them cease to operate or operate only on its terms.
Id. at 366.
68 Id. at 369-70. Dunne does not counsel a surrender to practice in response
to the inability of theory to direct practices, for that would be skewing what the techni
of teaching involves.
In being initiated into the practice of teaching, student-teachers need not
only experience in the classroom but also the right conditions for reflecting on
this experience-so that reflectiveness (which we have all the time been
clarifying under the name of "phronesis") can become more and more an
abiding attitude or disposition .... He needs a teacher who will help him to
reflect on what he is doing. Such a teacher, though not a theoretician in our
modem sense-or in the sense which, as we just saw, Aristotle scorns-will
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inextricable feature of practice, although the theoretical
disposition can be manifested within the ongoing dynamic of
the practice or from a relatively (although not actually)
removed perch of one commenting on the practice.
III. TAKING STOCK: A NEO-ARISTOTELIAN ACCOUNT OF THE
RELATIONSHIP OF THEORY AND PRACTICE UNDER
POSTMODERN CONDITIONS
Aristotle theorizes about ethical behavior, and also
about productive arts such as rhetoric. He characterizes ethical
knowledge as a cumulation of experiences that are molded
through reflection into a disposition that becomes part of the
being of the person, rather than a set of universal dictates that
can be learned and then applied. His relatively brief discussion
of phronsis serves as an important starting point for
Gadamer's destruction of the methodological conception of
knowledge that has triumphed in the age of modern science.
But Aristotle also advances a concept of techni that is
ambivalent and, under Dunne's careful (against the grain)
reading, similar to phronLsis. The productive knowledge of the
physician, artist or public speaker also evidences a subtle
relationship between theory and practice, despite Aristotle's
general claims that techni involves the application in a
particular setting of universal principles that have previously
been learned. These modern readings of Aristotle by Gadamer
and Dunne express Heidegger's earlier theme that the
dispersions of the originary Augenblick are properly
distinguished but not rigidly demarcated.
The role and possibilities of theory under postmodern
conditions are best explored with a neo-Aristotelian model that
links the insights of Heidegger, Gadamer and Dunne. The
principal lesson of this model is cautionary. Critical legal
theorists must not fall victim to the modernist project of
framing and then objectifying the focus of their study. The very
point of critical legal theory, as one expression of the broader
project of critical theory, is to challenge the modernist project,
which now indelibly shapes all human practices. Proposing a
theoretical intervention to "correct" legal practice from the
"outside" would be to reinforce modernity's sharp distinction
nonetheless be able to evince the logos of good practice (i.e., the kind of
context-bound logos [discussed earlier in the book]).
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between theory and practice, and therefore would undermine
the recovery of an originary comportment beneath the sharply
distinguished dispersions of "theory-as-research-agenda" and
"practice-as-implementation-of-technologies."
Gadamer effectively diagnoses the problem of theory in
the postmodern age. He argues that Western civilization has
now entered a third stage of progressive Enlightenment:
moving from the original dissolution of the Homeric epics and
the embrace of the discovery of pure truths on a mathematical
model in Ancient Greece; to the classical stage, inaugurated by
Copernicus, in which experience was organized inductively
under universal laws; and culminating in the modern stage
marked by the dominance of experts, global industrialization
and the surpassing of Christianity.69 This development is
marked by the ascendency of the technical conception of
knowledge. In Aristotle's terms, this ascendency means the
reduction of techni to mere technique and the eclipse of
phrontsis. Gadamer cautions against fueling this worldview by
pursuing theoretical interventions that, by their nature,
participate in the concealment of the genuine experience of
theory.
If we view the ever-widening movement of Enlightenment in the
second half of our century against this backdrop, what seems to be
new is that technical thinking is beginning to expand into a
universal view of the world. As the moral and religious basis of
Kant's idea of freedom has vanished by degrees from present-day
consciousness, man's self-consciousness has come to rest ever more
exclusively on his ability to do and to make things .... I think it is
our prepossession with the technological dream and our obsession
with emancipatory utopia that represent the prejudices of our time
70
and from which reflection, as the courage to think, needs to free us.
Critical legal theory, as the "courage to think" beyond the urge
toward mastery of one's world that gives rise to the scientistic
worldview, must be a form of "historical reflection" that "can
lay bare the presuppositions that lie behind these prejudices" of
modernity; it must reject the project of constructing an
"emancipatory utopia" in favor of stimulating "our social
reason"--largely obscured but not eliminated-"to awake from
its technological dream."71
69 See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, Science as an Instrument of Enlightenment, in
PRAISE OF THEORY, supra note 24, at 71-75.
70 Id. at 79.
71 Id. at 80, 83.
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Gadamer insists that theory cannot be a corrective from
outside-a demarcation of the appropriate way to see the
world-without embodying the delimiting prejudices of
modernity. Critics might argue that this assumes the point in
question: that modernity is "prejudiced" rather than the
triumph of historical enlightenment into a transparent and
universal reason. It is at this juncture that the neo-Aristotelian
conception of theory gains its critical bite. The idea of a closed
rationality, of the triumph (or end) of history, is precisely the
narrow conception of theory that Gadamer targets. Theory
can't rise above practice and grasp clearly the way things must
be and ever will be, except in the most narrow and artificial
realms of mathematics and basic natural science. Theory is a
component of dynamic practices, a form of participation in the
ancient sense of theoria as an envoy's participation in a
festival.
As Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics shows, theory
remains intimately connected with practice even when it seeks
to reflect on a practice without engaging in the practice. The
humble role of the philosopher in the hubristic age of science is
to call to mind the most important lesson that science teaches:
human finitude and the corresponding limitations on
knowledge. Working from this recognition, the philosopher's
task can only be to reinvigorate a "common reason" that lies
buried under technical necessity and universal prescriptions.
Gadamer, in classically Gadamerian terminology, makes this
case for theory most eloquently:
Don't worry that I'm going to conclude by recommending
philosophers as the experts of reason, so that the power of reason
can finally be raised beyond all doubt by filling our panel of experts.
We should be careful not to make fools of ourselves, especially by
claiming that our specialty is the universal that is reason: let alone
that reason should come to power through us. But perhaps it is, all
in all, a contradiction in terms that reason should have power and
exercise governance, and perhaps it is quite in order that the strange
guild of philosophers should remain almost invisible in the real
power struggles between peoples, states, classes, religions, world-
views, and economic systems. We do not speak in the name of
reason. Anyone who speaks in the name of reason contradicts
himself. For it is reasonable to acknowledge that one's own insight is
limited and for just that reason to be capable of better insights,
wherever they may come from.
To be sure, this definition is so universal that it applies equally
to scientific reason insofar as every researcher always knows that he
can himself be surpassed. But for just this reason science persists in
its ways. It is nevertheless reasonable, as we say, to be aware that
[Vol. 68: 3
A FUTURE FORETOLD
science is limited by its inability to reflect on its own presuppositions
and consequences. This too is an insight that overcomes a prejudice,
just like when an individual corrects old prejudices with a new
insight. Reason always consists in not blindly insisting on what one
holds true, but engaging critically with it. This is still what
enlightenment does, but not in the dogmatic form of a new absolute
rationality (Rationalitat) that always knows better-reason also
needs to be grasped with respect to itself and its own contingency in
a process of constant self-enlightenment. 1
Superficially construed, Gadamer's plea that philosophers not
adopt the experts' mantel of rationality appears to surrender
theory to practice, to eliminate the special role of theory. But it
is Dunne's reflections on the role of theory within teaching and
Gadamer's theoretical reflections on human understanding,
both drawing from Aristotle, that seek to maintain the delicate
equilibrium of theory and practice.
IV. IN PRAISE OF POSTMODERN LEGAL THEORY: THE MODEL
OF POSTMODERN PSYCHOTHERAPY
Perhaps surprisingly, Heidegger, Gadamer and Dunne
find in Aristotle's philosophy an account of theory that not only
can survive the challenges of postmodernity, but that inspires
praise. My discussion to this point, admittedly, has been overly
theoretical, and so I turn now to an exploration of a concrete
instance of the interconnections of theory and practice.
Postmodern approaches to psychotherapy provide a model of
the relationship between theory and practice for critical legal
theorists because these approaches exemplify a theoretically
informed hermeneutical activity. The therapist adopts a
theoretical posture to assist her client, but she does not pretend
to escape her hermeneutical engagement with the client in
dialogue. My use of postmodern psychotherapy as a model, of
course, recalls Aristotle's invocation of the physician in the
course of his theoretical investigation into ethics.73
72 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, The Power of Reason, in PRAISE OF THEORY, supra
note 24, at 37-49, 48. Gadamer's speech was given in Vienna at the height of the
student uprisings in 1968. Understood in this context, his pointed challenge to both
bureaucratic technicism and the ideology of emancipatory critique leading to utopia is
quite remarkable, as Gadamer resisted the sharp polarization of the time and
embodied the quest for a common social reason.
73 I have explained using postmodern psychotherapy as a model for critical
legal theory in detail in a recent article. See Francis J. Mootz III, Psychotherapeutic
Practice As a Model for Postmodern Legal Theory, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 299 (2000).
My brief overview of this model in the text that follows should be read in conjunction
with this earlier article, to which I refer the reader who seeks elaboration and citations
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Postmodern psychotherapists disavow the traditional
conception of psychoanalysis as a comprehensive theory that
permits the "expert" analyst to "see through" the patient's
neuroses. Instead, they adopt a philosophical position of "not-
knowing."74 Postmodern psychotherapists locate the critical
dimension of therapy in a collaborative dialogue with the client
that is oriented toward restoring the client's equilibrium,
rather than claiming the authority to artfully direct the client's
review of life options from the therapist's presumed position of
theoretically-secured superiority. Under this account, the
therapist is an expert only in facilitating the patient's attempts
to fashion a satisfactory life narrative, rather than an expert in
diagnosing what is wrong with the patient according to a
theoretically derived template.
Regarding psychotherapeutic dialogue as a site of
theoretical intervention provides an excellent example of my
neo-Aristotelian account of the relationship between theory and
practice. The "talking cure" is theoretically-informed, if we
regard theory as "tarrying" with the presencing of the world
rather than as mastering the world through a disciplining act
of subjectivity. In psychotherapeutic dialogue, the therapist is
not directing the client to divulge information according to
methodological rules; rather, she is opening herself to the client
and attending to what the client says. Postmodern
psychotherapists characterize their expertise in just these
terms: a therapist is an expert in "suspending" her urge to
diagnose quickly according to a template; she is an expert in
not "establishing understandings, explanations, and
interpretations based on prior experiences, formed truths, and
to the literature.
74 I draw from Harlene Anderson's theoretical defense of "not-knowing."
Anderson insists that change occurs in therapy through the emergence of new
meanings in dialogic conversation rather than as a result of technical interventions
designed to "fix" a "problem." HARLENE ANDERSON, CONVERSATION, LANGUAGE, AND
POSSIBILITIES: A POSTMODERN APPROACH TO THERAPY 108-31 (1997). She writes:
The more attention I paid to what clients were saying, the more I understood
that they knew more than I did or ever would about their lives, and the more
I realized how my knowing interfered with the telling of their stories and the
accessing of their resources. As a consequence, I have elevated the client's
voice to center stage; again-much like flipping the usual roles of therapists
(knowers) and clients (not-knowers)-therapists learn and clients teach.
A cornerstone of the conversation and the relationship is the concept of
not-knowing. . . .Not-knowing is the key feature that distinguishes my
collaborative approach from other therapies and that makes a pivotal
difference in a therapist's intent, direction and style.
Id. at 133.
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knowledge," but rather in facilitating a genuine dialogue which
is a collaborative discovery.75 This is a theoretically informed
practice, because it depends upon general insights into the
nature of conversational exchange, but it is theoretical in the
neo-Aristotelian sense that I have developed in this Article.
Gadamer and Dunne both stress Aristotle's lesson that theory
participates in practice, and this same insight is central to the
"not-knowing" stance adopted by postmodern psychotherapists.
As described by Harlene Anderson:
The [not-knowing] stance is not a technique or theory. It is not
manipulative, strategic, nor contrived, as thinking about it
cognitively might suggest. It is not deliberate in the sense of being
acted; however, it is intentional. I purposely want to be open,
genuine, appreciative, respectful, inviting, and curious-all important
characteristics of being in a therapy relationship that is mutual,
collaborative, cooperative, and egalitarian."
Theory works within practice as a disposition that overcomes
habit and prejudice, and as a reflection on that practice that
eschews efforts to formalize practice as the technical
accomplishment of pre-given theoretical insight.
Theory is important beyond its role in
psychotherapeutic dialogue, just as theory is important beyond
its role in rhetorical exchanges or ethical decision-making. In
the same way that Aristotle theorized about the interplay of
theory and practice in ethics (and suggested the same with
regard to rhetorical exchanges), postmodern psychotherapists
have theorized about psychotherapeutic dialogue. Anderson
insists that she uses theoretical knowledge not only in
therapeutic dialogue, but also to gain perspective from which
she can teach student-psychotherapists. Significantly, she
educates new therapists in a collaborative and dialogic manner
that is patterned on the therapy relationship, with the result
that educating students about general principles is embodied in
practical engagements.7 Postmodern psychotherapists insist
that their theoretical presupposition that human interaction is
a narratively structured hermeneutical-rhetorical event is
inseparable from their description of clinical practice. But,
theoretical elaboration of the intersubjective character of
human understanding can do little more than commend the
75 Id. at 137.
76 Id. at 107.
7 Id. at 248.
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pragmatic experience of therapeutic dialogue and seek to
facilitate this dialogue by reflecting on the practice. In other
words, theory can only seek to free the theoretical disposition
that already resides within a practice, since it would simply be
absurd to attempt to develop a theory that could
methodologically "produce" a genuine conversation.
While the "not-knowing" approach does not preclude a
theoretical assessment of the techniques and methods that
foster successful psychotherapeutic dialogue, postmodern
psychotherapists reject the idea that there can ever be a
methodological rulebook that literally can be picked up and
employed or lost and forgotten. Because postmodern
psychotherapists utilize practical knowledge within complex
and fluid situations, they generally embrace pluralistic and
interdisciplinary approaches. This does not mean that
techniques are irrelevant, but only that no particular model or
technique is uniquely necessary to any particular outcome. In
other words, there is a mixture of techni and phronsis at
work; more importantly, it is techni in the sense of Dunne's re-
working of Aristotle's concept rather than in the sense of a
technique guided by the theoretical perception of universal
laws. Postmodern psychotherapists theorize in their
psychotherapeutic practice, and also when they reflect on their
practice for the purpose of teaching others to become
psychotherapists. This theorizing is dramatically different than
the theorizing of social scientists working within the modern
scientific model; it is theorizing that is deserving of cultivation
and praise under postmodern conditions.
With the example of postmodern psychotherapy in
mind, the connections between theory and legal practice are
understood more easily. Postmodern psychotherapists provide
a model for breaking free from the "theoretical urge" 8 in a
manner that suggests that reliance on modernist conceptions of
theory runs counter to basic structures of human
understanding. Although postmodern psychotherapy and legal
practice are very different practices, the basic structures of
human understanding are equally operative in each case.
Construed at a sufficiently general level, the model of
psychotherapy suggests that legal theory is both a disposition
78 See STEVEN MAILLOUX, RHETORICAL POWER 3-18 (1989) (characterizing the
"theoretical urge" as the desire to stand outside the flux of a rhetorical-pragmatic
practice and devise a methodological key for correctly seeing that practice).
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within legal practice and also a reflection on this disposition.
The key lesson is that reflection on the disposition can never be
a narrow techni that produces the disposition; reflection is a
facilitation that does not gain a privileged perspective on the
practice from the perch of universal principles in the form of an
eidos.
In this short Article, I can only adumbrate the contours
of legal theory under the neo-Aristotelian conception of theory.
In an important respect, critical legal theory is found in the
creative hermeneutical discernment and rhetorical elaboration
that marks the practice of lawyers and judges. Tarrying with
the presencing of social meaning in legal settings rather than
proceeding in a mechanical or rote manner is a theoretical
disposition that is particularly stimulated in legal practice.
Gadamer celebrates legal reasoning as a challenge to the
methodological conception of human understanding, noting
that the practice of law exemplifies his thesis that
understanding always involves application because the lawyer
is enmeshed in the practical demands of the case at hand and
cannot pretend to pronounce the meaning of the law for all
cases and for all time. He challenges the modern conception of
theory as a narrow techni, arguing that "the idea of a perfect
legal dogmatics, which would make every judgment a mere act
of subsumption, is untenable,"79 and therefore, legal practice
"does not mean first understanding a given universal in itself
and then afterward applying it to a concrete case. It is the very
understanding of the universal-the text-itself.""0 Academic
theorists should take as their primary goal the facilitation of
this theoretical disposition within practice. This can be
accomplished through scholarship that offers creative readings
of legal doctrine, even to the point that the creative reading
challenges the legitimacy of the doctrine under discussion.
Reflections on legal practice by academics reflect the
theoretical disposition in a different posture. Legal theorists in
the academy often write about the practice of law, seeking to
gain perspective on the creative readings of legal doctrine. In
this vein, legal theory is an effort to facilitate the theoretical
elements of practice, to unfreeze the habitual and prejudiced
self-understandings that mute the theoretical disposition
within practice. Theory in this sense is a reflection designed to
7' GADAMER, supra note 28, at 330.
'0 Id. at 341.
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free the expression of the theoretical disposition within
practice. The legal scholar cannot mistake this project as a
special authority to lecture practitioners from the supposed
heights of theoretical insight. Rather, the role of theoretical
reflection is to regain a sense of the underlying practice and to
inspire the "courage to think" within that practice. Legal
academics are particularly well-suited to this conception of
theory because most are former practitioners. While historians,
philosophers, economists and sociologists may have relevant
theoretical insights about law, they will find it more difficult to
avoid a theoretical posture that seeks to objectify legal practice,
master legal practice, and then prescribe methodological cures
for the perceived failings of legal practice.
Modeling critical legal theory on the work of postmodern
psychotherapists, I contend that legal theorists should reject
the idea that "law" is a concept awaiting explication in favor of
the view that law is a narratively structured social process. The
participants in legal practice present their anxieties in a
manner similar to the individual entering psychotherapy. The
neo-Aristotelian model of theory exemplified in postmodern
psychotherapy counsels the critical legal theorist to attend to
the client rather than imposing a theoretically-derived
template onto the legal tradition. The critical legal theorist
must take seriously lawyers and judges struggling with
practical problems, rather than regard them as self-deluding
simpletons who must be diagnosed rather than dialogically
engaged.
Critical legal theorists work to disrupt unproductive
abstractions and the false sense of necessity within legal
discourse by means of a hermeneutical-rhetorical engagement
that seeks to recover the full breadth and depth of a practice
that has calcified into dogma. The legal theorist has no
recourse to, or any need for, an external standard of critique
against which practices can be assessed, because the critical
project identifies and then stimulates the theoretical
disposition within legal practice. The goal of critical legal
theory is not to develop an ideal legal narrative and then
import it into practice; rather, its goal is to reveal the activity
of theory within the creative narrative of law as overcoming
unhelpful, static conventions, thus opening the possibility for
more satisfactory participation in the ongoing process of
creating and transforming legal meaning.
The theoretical posture of "not-knowing" does not
preclude the use of techniques to facilitate critical inquiry,
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although there can be no science of critical legal theory in
which the critic methodologically transforms legal practice in
accordance with a strong guiding theory. Empirical
quantification, sociological description, ethnographic study and
economic assessment all can play a role in the critic's project.
As postmodern psychotherapists emphasize, however,
techniques and methods are only helpful to the extent that
they broaden discourse. Insistence on the superiority of a
particular methodology betrays a rigidity and narrowness of
theoretical understanding that runs counter to the pluralism of
postmodern critical engagement and the goal of freeing the
originary theoretical disposition.
Bill Eskridge's theoretical work on statutory
interpretation provides an excellent example of theoretical
intervention in the neo-Aristotelian sense that I have
developed in this Article. Eskridge advances a theory of
"dynamic statutory interpretation" in response to the various
theories of interpretation (intentionalist, purposivist and
textualist) that have been formulated to constrain judicial
interpretation of statutes." Eskridge's theory does not seek to
direct the practice of interpreting statutes; his purpose is to
reveal the nature of the practice and to clear away conceptual
confusions that inhibit the practice. Eskridge conducts a
genealogical inquiry," as well as normative and empirical
investigations into the practice of interpreting statutes. But
Eskridge emphasizes that he draws only pragmatic injunctions
from his theoretical reflections, rather than methodological
rules.
How do judges interpret statutes? How should they? Many
commentators argue that judicial interpretation is, or at least ought
to be, inspired by grand theory. We think these commentators are
wrong, both descriptively and normatively: Judge's approaches to
81 The theory was developed in several important law review articles, see
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479
(1987), William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990) [hereinafter Practical Reasoning],
and William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
609 (1990) [hereinafter Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation], consolidated in a book, see
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994), and
elaborated in subsequent publications, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994) and WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (3d ed. 2001).
"' See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of
the "Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990 (2001).
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statutory interpretation are generally eclectic, not inspired by any
grand theory, and this is good methodology.
8 3
Reading Gadamer critically . . . does not provide many
conventional legal insights. Gadamer does not tell us what steps to
follow when we interpret statutes, what evidence to exclude, what
dictionary to use. Hermeneutics is not methodological and directive
(as Gadamer sees it anyway). It is, instead, illuminating and
therapeutic. Hermeneutics helps us see what we are already doing,
to see behind some of the myths that we have intellectually
constructed, and (I hope) to throw ourselves into the process in a less
alienated way.4
Theory is important to practice, but not superordinate to
practice. Consequently, Eskridge champions a pluralistic and
rhetorical approach to legal reasoning about the meaning of
statutes.85
Eskridge's theory of dynamic statutory interpretation
also clarifies the role of theory in legal practice. Eskridge
characterizes critical theory as one variation of dynamic
statutory interpretation, albeit an approach that only rarely is
acknowledged in judicial opinions, and his theorizing reflects
on the potential for this kind of critical intervention within
practice. The development of the "reasonable woman" standard
of hostile work environment sexual harassment claims under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides one example
of theoretical tarrying within practice. As Title VII doctrine
matured, a number of feminist scholars argued that sexual
harassment law was unconsciously constrained by the adoption
of a gendered perspective about permissible workplace
behavior. For example, Kathryn Abrams persuasively argued
that the development of the law of hostile work environment
sexual discrimination was hampered by a formal notion of
equal treatment that obscured and preserved gendered
workplace norms that inhibited the full participation of
women.86 Citing her article, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
endorsed a "reasonable woman" test in hostile work
environment cases, finding that conduct "that many men
Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 81, at 321-22.
M Eskridge, Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, supra note 81, at 679.
85 Eskridge's "funnel of abstraction" model of statutory interpretation, which
was introduced in Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 81, at 353 and
continues to play an important role in his theorizing, evidences this pluralistic and
rhetorical approach.
8' See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1989).
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consider unobjectionable may offend many women," and that
"Congress did not enact Title VII to codify prevailing sexist
prejudices" under the guise of a seemingly neutral "reasonable
person" test.87 Subsequently, Abrams has written about the
difficulties facing courts seeking to interpret Title VII in a
manner that will effectively combat sexism in the American
workplace and she has reflected at greater length on the
advantages and disadvantages of the "reasonable woman"
standard.'
If Eskridge theorizes about statutory interpretation,
Abrams (and the lawyers and appellate judges who read her
work) theorize within statutory interpretation. These different
theoretical comportments are rooted in the practice under
question, even if they can be distinguished. The hallmark of
Eskridge's theory and Abrams's proposal for a "reasonable
woman" standard of hostile work environment sexual
harassment is that they both tarry with legal practice. This
theorizing evidences both the practical wisdom of phronisis
and the productive art of techni, because excellent lawyering is
both normatively guided and skillfully executed. Legal theory,
if it is to deserve our praise, must remain attentive to the
practice at hand, regardless of the degree to which it suspends
the press of everyday lawyering in an effort to attend to the
problem at hand.
CONCLUSION
Theory has fallen on hard times, and the predicament
facing legal theorists is exacerbated by postmodernity. Our
complex attitudes toward theory appear to be inconsistent, if
not incoherent. On one hand, theory is powerful and liberating
because it is the experience of rising above our animalistic
impulses and reactions. On the other hand, theory is impotent
and misleading because it is the fruitless quest to rise above
human finitude. Aristotle, when read through the lens of
modern interpreters who resolve his equivocations against the
excesses of modernity, illuminates a new understanding of
theory that can survive the challenges of postmodernity
87 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79, 881 (9th Cir. 1991).
"8 See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169 (1998); Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female
Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479 (1994).
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revealed in this paradox. Theory can be restored to its proper
place, deserving of praise: not all-powerful, not impotent.
Surely there is irony in trying to conclude these
reflections. How are legal theorists supposed to react to my
assessment; what are they to do in response to my claims? My
thesis has been that theory cannot deliver definitive answers to
these questions. But there is a purpose in theoretical inquiry,
even at the level of abstraction at which I have been working.
As Eskridge suggests, the purpose is therapeutic, by which he
means it is designed to rid us of misunderstandings and
unfruitful ways of thinking. My goal is to awaken in legal
theorists a recollection of their finitude and historicality, and to
persuade them that they should abandon "theoretical" efforts to
step outside their hermeneutical situation. Critical legal theory
is a disposition within legal practice, supplemented by second
order accounts of legal practice capable only of awakening this
disposition, and supplemented by more general accounts (such
as this Article) capable only of motivating better second order
accounts. If we ignore or suppress theory only at our peril, it is
equally true that we court danger by asking too much of theory
by elevating it above our practices.
The neo-Aristotelian theory advanced in this Article is
reflexive. But, as Gadamer explained in his reflections on his
own theoretical inquiry into philosophical hermeneutics, this
reflexivity is not disabling. Gadamer writes that the theoretic
stance of his philosophical hermeneutics
only makes us aware reflectively of what is performatively at play in
the practical experience of understanding. And so it appears to me
that the answer given by Aristotle to the question about the
possibility of a moral philosophy holds true as well for our interest in
hermeneutics. His answer was that ethics is only a theoretical
enterprise and that anything said by way of a theoretic description of
the forms of right living can be at best of little help when it comes to
the concrete application to human experience of life. And yet the
universal desire to know does not break off at the point where
concrete practical discernment is the decisive issue. The connection
between the universal desire to know and concrete practical
discernment is a reciprocal one. So it appears to me, heightened
theoretic awareness about the experience of understanding and the
practice of understanding, like philosophical hermeneutics and one's
own self-understanding, are inseparable.8 9
89 Gadamer, Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task, supra note
43, at 112.
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Although this conception of theory might sound modest and
uneventful, it poses a substantial challenge to modem
academic consciousness. By reining in the grasping
deformations of theory as a narrow technJ Heidegger,
Gadamer and Dunne advocate a neo-Aristotelian approach that
can inspire wonder and stimulate praise of our theoretical lives
in the law.

